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ABSTRACT
The invasion of Iraq by America and its allies in 2003 represented a transformation for the 
country’s capital city, Baghdad. This confl ict was particularly urban, maintained a neo-liberal 
agenda to change the political and economic structures, and resulted in strong divisive security 
measures being implemented throughout the city, thus altering the urban environment. The 
changes to the city created signifi cant challenges for Baghdad’s residents - they became 
isolated, segregated, and often immobile. Consequently, many of their social and economic 
networks have been severed. While governmental plans for redevelopment have been mired 
in corruption and stalled implementation, several community-based initiatives have emerged 
which seem to transcend and/or address the urban challenges that Baghdadis face. These 
initiatives will be explored through case studies in terms of their network structures, successes, 
limitations, and potential to contribute to the redevelopment of Baghdad. It is evident, 
furthermore, that planners have an important role in identifying these initiatives, analyzing 
them to illuminate successful paths for both sustainability and growth, and understanding the 
stakeholders who are part of the universe the initiatives operate in for benefi cial partnerships 
and stronger networks. 
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Baghdad was once a highly 
diverse city of exchange, social 
connection, interaction, and 
integration. By the time of the 
2003 invasion by the United States, 
Baghdad and Iraq had been subject 
to years of war and sanctions. 
Consequently, its economy became 
inwardly oriented and under-
developed. However, the Iraq War 
marked a signifi cant turning point 
for Baghdad because the confl ict 
was a particularly urban one, which 
took place in Baghdad’s streets.
The invasion forces intended 
to turn Iraq’s economy into a free-
market, capitalist model for the 
Middle East such that international 
private fi rms could invest in 
and profi t from the political and 
economic change as well as Iraq’s 
oil resources. This intention was 
not immediately realized due 
to the insecurity and instability 
which resulted from the invasion. 
Investors were reluctant to 
participate in Iraq’s economy and, 
instead, the informal economy grew 
and GDP shrank. 
In an eff ort to remedy this 
and gain control of Baghdad and, 
thus, its economy, US military 
policy began to implement strong 
security measures, including the 
walling of several of Baghdad’s 
neighborhoods, despite the protests 
and disapproval of many residents. 
The walls are one of a list of ways 
in which confl ict and military policy 
have altered the urban landscape of 
Baghdad in order to take control of 
the city and which can be described 
as evidence of confl ict urbanism. 
These short and long term urban 
changes have come with signifi cant 
social and economic change, 
especially the extreme segregation 
of Baghdad’s neighborhoods. The 
major consequences of confl ict 
urbanism on Baghdadi residents 
have therefore been their physical 
and socio-economic isolation and 
reduced access to and participation 
in the city and its functions. 
Several attempts at 
reconstruction and new urban 
plans have been made, but many 
have stalled because of low 
quality practices evident in their 
implementation, corruption, and 
continued instability; Baghdad’s 
infrastructure thus remains severely 
limited. Furthermore, it is diffi  cult to 
accept the contradiction present in 
any dependence on redevelopment 
plans implemented by the 
municipality and/or by international 
organizations who are implicated 
in the division and alteration of 
Baghdad, especially considering 
the continued signifi cant presence 
of the US in the city’s Green 
Zone. In any case, the goals of 
the municipality and the national 
government for redevelopment in 
Baghdad do not necessarily match 
up with residents’ needs. The prime 
example of this disconnect is in the 
political approach to security, the 
social costs of which are considered 
worthwhile by policy makers but 
too great to bear by residents. 
There is an argument to be 
made, therefore, to approach the 
challenges created by confl ict 
urbanism from amongst Baghdadi 
citizenry through community-based 
and crowd-sourced initiatives. 
These groups eff ectively transcend 
the divisions which confl ict has 
rendered in the city’s social 
fabric by reconnecting residents 
regardless of ethnicity or religion 
and allowing them to participate 
in the social redevelopment of 
Baghdad, share resources and 
contribute human capital. If they 
can survive the strong political 
forces of division, they may also 
be the most promising route to 
deeper, sustainable security and a 
more stable, diversifi ed economy 
in Baghdad as they slowly, but 
surely rebuild the networks which 
Baghdad was once based on and 
focus on crowd-sourced education 
and project development. Planning 
can play an instrumental role in 
both identifying what initiatives 
need for success and sustainability 
as well as in charting pathways 
through which their members can 
turn around and use what they have 
gained through participation in 
such networks to then contribute to 
the redevelopment of Baghdad.
This thesis will use three case 
studies to illustrate this alternative 
to redevelopment in Baghdad as 
they currently exist. It is evident from 
the case studies that community-
based initiatives successfully build 
strong networks and fi ll gaps in 
Baghdad’s physical, social, and 
economic infrastructure for their 
target demographics. As such, they 
are also clearly limited in terms of 
addressing the needs of more varied 
groups (i.e., people from diff erent 
age groups, economic class, and 
educational status). Finally this 
thesis will recommend methods 
and considerations for the growth, 
strengthening, and support of 
community-based initiatives along 
the lines of replicability/scalability 
and from the perspectives of 
diff erent stakeholders.
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BACKGROUND
Baghdad, Pre-Confl ict 
Socioeconomic Diversity
Since ancient civilizations lived 
in a land called Mesopotamia, now 
modern-day Iraq, the region has 
been “one of the most religiously 
and ethnically diverse societies 
in the Middle East” (Blake, 2014, 
People). Besides Arabs, there 
have historically been ethnic 
communities of Turks, Turkmen, 
Assyrians, Lur, and Armenians in 
addition to the large northern 
region of predominantly Kurdish 
Iraqis. Religions have also always 
been varied, including both Sunni 
and Shiite Muslims, Christians, 
Yazidis, Mandaeans, Jews, and 
Baha’is. (Blake, 2014, People) 
The Iraqi nationality is directly 
related to and often defi ned by 
the religious and ethnic mix of its 
people. However, this mix has been 
diluted and seriously threatened as 
a result of the American invasion 
of Iraq in 2003, a point which will 
be explored further in following 
sections of this paper.
As the capital of Iraq and “...
the country’s political, economic, 
and communications hub” (Blake, 
2014, People), Baghdad has 
always attracted members of all of 
these communities. Furthermore, 
Baghdad’s varied communities 
often lived side by side. “Baghdad 
was once a city where Sunni, Shiite 
and Christian lived side by side, 
conscious that they belonged to 
diff erent sects but not frightened 
of one another” (Cockburn, 2013). 
Although the city’s people were 
diff erent, they were not always 
diff erentiated - at least not in 
everyday life.
The rich social diversity of 
Baghdad contributed to the city’s 
economic diversity and intellectual 
wealth as well. Descriptions of 
the city at its social and economic 
height paint a picture of a highly 
interactive stage for the crossing 
of diff erent beliefs, traditions, 
and values. “Baghdad is a multi-
faith multi-ethnic city, of crowded 
markets, cafes, mosques, churches, 
temples, monuments and shrines 
for all faiths” (Zangana, 2010, p. 
48). Indeed, the city’s markets 
and cafes reveal deep traditions 
of exchange and intellectual 
production. There are many historic 
markets such as those found in 
the Shorja neighborhood where 
Baghdadis could fi nd all sorts 
of spices, foods, and goods. The 
centrality and reputations of such 
markets drew many people from all 
neighborhoods of the city to come 
together and interact. Al Mutanabbi 
Street, as the destination to 
shop for and discuss books, is a 
favorite example of the Baghdadi 
intellectual market (Abdul-Ahad, 
2008). A contemporary magazine 
based in the Middle East describes 
the intellectual fl ow within the 
region, saying “[b]ooks are written 
in Cairo, published in Beirut and 
read in Baghdad” (Kalimat, 2011).
During times of political 
stability, Iraq’s economy did very 
well by international standards. 
The nationalization of oil gave the 
Iraqi government considerable 
resources to develop and grow the 
country. In fact, the government 
was able to quadruple oil revenues 
within 3 years and support Iraqi 
growth in various economic sectors 
such that “[b]y 1980 Iraq had the 
second largest economy in the 
Arab world...and had developed 
a complex, centrally planned 
economy dominated by the state” 
(Blake, 2014, Economy).
Baghdad, Confl ict & the Turning 
Point
Since 1980, Iraq has suff ered 
some sort of confl ict, whether 
by war or economic sanctions. 
Iraq’s society and economy slowly 
regressed over this period such The main gate of the University of Baghdad.
Image source: Sada Facebook page
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that, by the time of the American 
invasion in 2003, Iraq’s economy 
became highly inward-looking. 
Many of the achievements gained 
during Iraq’s period of growth 
described above were lost as 
the infrastructure that was built 
deteriorated and the government 
could no longer take full advantage 
of its oil resources. During this time, 
GDP dropped signifi cantly and the 
eff ects changed people’s lives and 
reduced the former vibrancy of 
Baghdad and its local markets. “[M]
ost Iraqi cities had lost their historic 
economic centers of gravity,” and 
their residents could not make a 
living wage and were thus stuck in 
poverty (Gregory, 2011, p. 7). The 
Iraqi economy was not productive 
- it had lost the ability to trade, 
could not export its resources, had 
lost any reliable infrastructure, 
and could neither fi nd nor educate 
skilled workers. Despite all of 
this, the government was able to 
maintain strict political control 
of the country and it may even be 
argued that the eff ects of confl ict 
and sanctions actually worked to 
“further [consolidate] power in the 
hands of the government” (Blake, 
2014, Government and society). 
This is the picture of Iraq at the 
time of the invasion by the US - 
economically weak, deteriorating, 
and politically stagnant.
The invasion of Iraq by the 
US and its allies in 2003 was not 
just another in a list of confl icts. 
It represents a crucial turning 
point in the history of Iraq for 
several reasons. First, this war 
was a particularly urban war, 
both relative to Iraq’s previous 
confl icts and in the general history 
of warfare. The front lines were 
in the city streets and Baghdad, 
as the capital of Iraq and seat of 
Saddam Hussein’s government, 
was the primary strategic target to 
achieving victory. Civilians were 
very directly aff ected - their daily 
lives were altered, school and work 
were suspended, millions migrated 
and almost as many were injured 
or killed (Gregory, 2006, p. 12). 
Furthermore, the invading forces 
were intent on implementing a neo-
liberal agenda (Gregory, 2011) by 
transforming Iraq’s political system 
from a dictatorship to a democracy 
and its economy to a free market 
model in order to profi t off  of 
private investment in the country’s 
reconstruction (Looney, 2006, p. 
991). Baghdadi blogger Riverbend 
expresses the reality she sees daily 
in her home city, saying “...this war 
is about oil but it is also about huge 
corporations that are going to make 
billions off  reconstructing what was 
damaged during this war” (as cited 
in Gregory, 2011, p. 1). The invasion 
was furthermore motivated by 
interventionist strategy, using the 
perspective that “[d]emocracy and 
human rights could be missile-
delivered as the by-product 
of removing Saddam Hussein” 
(Strawson & Collins, 2012, p. 311).
However, political and economic 
transformations were hindered by 
the instability which followed the 
overthrow of the Iraqi government. 
An insurgency made up of diff erent 
groups had formed and prevented 
security in Baghdad. Consequently, 
investor confi dence was 
undermined, “preventing market-
driven mechanisms from playing 
their anticipated role” (Looney, 
2006, p. 991). These challenges 
were met with a hasty strategy from 
the Coalition Provisional Authority, 
a temporary governing body 
appointed by the US, in the form of 
“...liberal reforms [which] did little 
to improve conditions for Iraqis or 
1988 19901991 2003 20062007 2011
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calm a growing insurgency” (Blake, 
2014, Economy). The priority of the 
invading coalition then was to gain 
control over the city and reduce 
instability through strategies of 
division. The concept of “ethno-
sectarianism” was thus created 
“‘as a framework for managing 
Iraqi political society…[in which] 
separation would block any 
collective nationalist movement 
that could otherwise threaten the 
neo-liberal project’” (Gregory, 
2011, p. 5). Policies of division and 
segregation were implemented 
throughout Baghdad based on this 
concept.
Ethno-sectarianism would take 
over the city and culminate in the 
2006-07 sectarian civil war, which 
was the high point of violence 
in Baghdad (Iraq Body Count). It 
is during this time that the most 
dramatic movement toward the 
segregation of the city would 
occur. As people living in mixed 
neighborhoods felt threatened by 
violence due to ethnic cleansing, 
they chose to move to more 
homogenous areas. During this 
time, the American military 
increased the number of troops 
in Baghdad in a strategy known as 
the surge. Although the strategists 
who implemented the surge credit 
it with reducing violence, there is 
evidence to show that changes in 
levels of violence in Baghdad were 
actually due to a cycle in which 
segregation promoted violence, 
which furthered segregation, 
which increased violence until the 
city was nearly fully segregated 
such that people did not have the 
motivation to instigate violence 
for ethnic cleansing any longer. 
The demography of Baghdad has 
changed drastically over this very 
short period of time as a result of 
the strong force of segregation 
and, inevitably, this has had a huge 
impact on the pre-confl ict socio-
economic dynamics which were so 
connected to the city’s diversity. 
It is interesting to note that those 
dynamics were altered around new 
defi nitions of identity in Baghdad. 
Derek Gregory (2006, p. 14) asserts 
that the Sunni/Shia dichotomy 
“is an essentialist identity on 
a complex cultural-historical 
fi eld” and “violence...has been a 
signifi cant means of manufacturing 
identity in Baghdad” more than it 
is a “pure expression of sectarian 
affi  liation.”
Furthermore, the city-wide 
control policies are crucial in setting 
the trajectory of the development 
of Baghdad and the potential for 
real democratisation. As such, 
the long term implications of the 
divisive actions taken in the city 
cannot be overemphasized. Scott A. 
Bollens (2008, p. 1259) has found 
that, “[a]midst democratisation, 
urban policies can articulate early 
in political transitions new city-
building logics and expectations 
regarding how private-power and 
public interest, and ethnic interests 
and city-wide needs, are to interact 
under a new regime.” Recently in 
Baghdad, urban policies that have 
been implemented are setting 
negative logics and expectations; 
the very process of transition to 
democracy, therefore, may “severely 
restrict and weaken the eventual 
democratic state” (Bollens, 2008, 
p. 1256), indicating a bleak future 
for Baghdad’s governance and 
for the meaningful participation 
of its residents in political and 
development processes.
The damage wrought by sectarian violence.
Image source: Mohammed Ameen, Reuters
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Fig. 2 Cycle of Violence & Segregation
URBAN CONFLICT & COMMUNITY INITIATIVES  /  BAGHDAD 08
Urban Landscape
As described earlier, the 
confl icts Iraq has suff ered since 
2003 have been particularly urban. 
As such, their eff ects manifest in 
the urban environment of Baghdad 
and directly aff ect the daily 
experience of Baghdad’s residents. 
Furthermore, the eff ects of confl ict 
were primarily the result of military 
and political strategy, which 
intentionally changed the city in 
order to gain control. The most 
prevalent urban control strategies 
included the walling of volatile 
neighborhoods, checkpoints 
in conjunction with walls and 
throughout Baghdad’s roads, and 
the creation of the Green Zone. All 
of these strategies are exclusionary, 
promote segregation and division 
among Baghdadi people, and 
reduce mobility in and access to the 
city - in other words, they were the 
catalysts for ethno-sectarianism.
Urban walls come in two basic 
forms: the high blast walls, which are 
made of 12-20 foot high concrete 
blocks weighing 14,000 pounds, 
and the shorter “Jersey” barriers 
of the type often used as highway 
dividers in the US (Zangana, 2010, 
p. 43). At the height of their 
implementation during the surge, 
coalition forces had “erected more 
than 3,000 individual sections of 
concrete blast walls throughout the 
city” (Zangana, 2010, p. 43). Military 
strategists claim that the walling 
of neighborhoods is eff ective at 
reducing violence essentially by the 
isolation of volatile areas such that 
surveillance can be comprehensive 
and restrictive (Kilcullen, 2007). 
Former Chief Strategist to the US 
State Department David Kilcullen 
(2007) describes their eff ectiveness 
according to three parameters: by 
restricting the entry of terrorists 
into the area, restricting terrorists’ 
ability to attack from the area, 
and protecting the residents 
of the area from retaliation by 
outside terrorists. Therefore, 
they have been implemented for 
the extreme control of specifi c 
neighborhoods as a way to address 
the very high violence associated 
with the sectarian civil war. Most 
of the walls were built around 
Sunni neighborhoods, with the 
obvious and signifi cant eff ect of 
“reinforc[ing] the major ethno-
sectarian fault lines” (Gregory, 
2006, p. 34). The neighborhood 
of Adhamiya stands out as being 
the fi rst to receive this treatment 
and as a historically Sunni center 
within Baghdad which had become 
surrounded by majority Shia 
areas during the civil war. The 
argument for walling Adhamiya 
was to contain this highly volatile 
area from which insurgents and Al 
Qaeda were operating and carrying 
out violent attacks on Baghdad’s 
Shia population. 
In a way, this transformation 
of the city into dozens of highly 
controlled checkpoints, walls, and 
surveillance mechanisms works 
to temporarily prevent violence. 
This approach is certainly not 
sustainable, however, because 
Baghdad’s citizens do not support 
it, deep resources are required 
to keep it going, and the city 
cannot fully function under such 
restrictions. “A short journey 
across the city can take hours with 
roads blocked off  and numerous 
checkpoints” (Gregory, 2006, p. 
36), which means that people are 
increasingly isolated in their gated 
neighborhoods, making it more 
diffi  cult for them to get to school 
and work or to safely operate their 
shops and restaurants in areas 
where they may not be welcome. 
Especially “in the city’s poorer 
districts, the air is still rife with 
tension...safety has not returned 
to the city in any lasting fashion. 
Military vehicles still lurk on every 
corner and murders and bombings 
strike” (Erickson, 2013). Clearly, 
the eff ect is some safety with the 
price of strong social and economic 
isolation and stagnation. Derek 
Gregory quotes journalist James 
Denselow, who commented that 
these “gated communities” are “‘a 
systematic attempt to transfer the 
confl ict into a deep freeze rather 
than address the root causes of 
violence’” (2006, p. 35).
Instead, the walls have 
negatively aff ected Baghdadi life 
in ways which have likely reduced 
potential for true structural change 
for safety and redevelopment. The 
city’s social, economic, and physical 
fl ows have been interrupted 
for years. “Baghdad has been 
segmented by a maze of ‘security 
walls’ that has fundamentally 
altered the nature of Iraqi life, 
reinforcing the sectarian divisions 
that were foisted upon the country 
with the Anglo-American invasion 
and occupation” (Zangana, 2010, 
p. 41). Although policy makers and 
military strategists assert that the 
benefi ts of walling outweigh these 
repercussions, Baghdadi residents 
are acutely aware of the severance 
of their networks by the walls and 
the ways in which their lives and 
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homes will be negatively aff ected. 
The walls are thus commonly known 
amongst Baghdadis as occupation/
hatred/sectarian/segregation walls 
(Zangana, 2010, p. 43). Ghaith 
Abdul-Ahad (2008), a journalist who 
grew up in Baghdad and emigrated, 
returns to visit Adhamiya and the 
Shia dominated neighborhood of 
Qahira on the other side of the 
highway. These neighborhoods 
are divided by the walls, creating 
a scene along the highway which 
“resembles the West Bank” (Abdul-
Ahad, 2008). However, Abdul-Ahad 
interviews a resident of Qahira who 
lives near the wall and expresses 
dissatisfaction with the policy, 
going so far as to say that it is 
unnecessary. Indeed, “the walling of 
Baghdad is a measure to control the 
popular and to enforce a new social 
reality...impacting commerce, social 
relations and the Iraqi culture” 
(Zangana, 2010, p. 43). They have 
also enabled the homogenization 
and labelling of certain areas, both 
to make a case for building walls 
and to speed up segregation. In 
Adhamiya, for example, which had 
been designated as a particularly 
dangerous neighborhood and 
hotbed for Al Qaeda activity, 
“Muslims and Christians [had] been 
living in a closely knit community 
for centuries” (Zangana, 2010, p. 
45). The neighborhood’s identity 
and demographics have been 
transformed as a result of the “Great 
Wall of Adhamiya” (Nizza, 2007).
One of the most controversial 
gated communities created in 
Baghdad by the security walls 
is that of the Green Zone. This 
neighborhood houses Iraqi 
politicians and bureaucracy as well 
as foreign embassies, including 
the US embassy compound, which 
is the largest embassy presence in 
the world. For the people inside 
this area, the walls are considered 
‘security walls’ (Zangana, 2010, 
p. 43). The walling of this 
neighborhood diff ers, therefore, 
because it has been implemented 
not only to keep the area secure, but 
also because those within it choose 
to be isolated. As Haifa Zangana 
so eloquently puts it, “[o]ne type 
is to wall in Iraqis…[a]nother is 
to wall in the occupiers and their 
client regime” (2010, p. 42). The 
Green Zone is thus one of the safest 
areas in Baghdad, but at the cost 
of incredible impermeability and 
isolation. The result is that those 
who claim to be strategizing and 
working for the Iraqi people are 
highly isolated from the people and 
are living in a diff erent, insulated 
reality. Furthermore, it is clear 
that, despite appearances and 
media claims to the contrary, the 
US has not left Iraq. The embassy 
compound is heavily walled and 
fortifi ed and is so large as to 
provide space and facilities enough 
such that American personnel 
do not have need to leave its 
borders. Furthermore, it has altered 
Baghdad’s urban landscape. It is 
fundamentally a new type of urban 
development through militarization 
and denaturalization of the city 
in which naturally green areas are 
replaced (Mehta, 2013, p. 59). The 
embassy and associated security 
apparatus have altered Baghdad’s 
skyline and symbolize the 
“replicating network of mirroring 
walls that refl ect and authenticate 
the occupying presence of the 
coalition, while refracting Iraqi lives 
through their divisiveness” (Mehta, 
2013, p. 59).
This environment has created 
a regulatory vacuum that is being 
taken advantage of by investors 
who are actually attracted to 
the chaotic scene created by 
insecurity. These are people 
looking to make a quick profi t in 
construction and they are doing so 
without regard to Baghdad’s urban 
character. According to Professor 
of Architecture Ghada Al Slik of the 
University of Baghdad, construction 
and development is happening 
on formerly green areas, often 
using cheap contractors and cheap 
The walls of the Green Zone.
Image source: media.worldbulletin.net
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materials. This sort of movement is 
negatively aff ecting the city’s urban 
landscape. For example, illegal 
subdivision of lots has become 
common so, where house plots were 
originally 200-1,000 sq km, many 
have been split down to 50-70 sq 
km, thus rapidly and signifi cantly 
increasing Baghdad’s density 
without consideration for residents’ 
living standards. Furthermore, high-
rise buildings are given exceptions 
to permit construction regardless of 
their eff ects on the city’s skyline or 
local height regulations. (G. Al Slik, 
personal communication, February 
6, 2014)
The urban eff ects of confl ict 
have thus created an environment 
in which residents have reduced 
access to the city and little to 
no control over the fast paced 
transformations occurring around 
them. This is important because 
sovereignty in the city for the 
individual resident has to do with 
a sense of owning the city, or, as 
Diane E. Davis (2011, p. 231) points 
out, it has to do with Lefebvre’s 
conceptualization of the “right 
to the city.” She further explores 
the concept by pointing out that 
“it is not merely that the political 
ideals of citizenship are met by 
the ‘right to the city’ but also that 
all citizens enjoy social and spatial 
inclusion...through everyday 
urban social practices built on 
unrestricted fl ows…” (Davis, 
2011, p. 231). Sovereignty for 
the resident indicates citizenship 
and contributes to identity, but 
identity is being manufactured 
through violence (Gregory, 2006) 
and neither spatial inclusion 
nor unrestricted fl ows truly 
exist in Baghdad; without these 
ingredients, it will be diffi  cult 
for Baghdad’s current structural 
challenges to be remedied because 
the city’s character and identity 
will be constituted by those of its 
residents.
Local Economy
The isolation, immobility, 
and segregation caused by the 
policies that were implemented 
for control of the city caused 
serious disruptions to Baghdad’s 
local economy.  The fl ow of not 
only people, but also of goods is 
hindered by walls and checkpoints 
and is often times even stopped. 
A vegetable seller describes the 
ordeal, saying “[i]f they don’t let 
me through that checkpoint I have 
to drive all around the area and try 
to get through another checkpoint, 
and 99% I will be dead” (Abdul-
Ahad, 2008). The risk is huge, but 
people must maintain livelihoods. 
The economy has simply slowed 
as a result and people have often 
chosen to relocate businesses 
closer to their own residences, such 
that they do not have to face these 
dangers. Business began to be 
“conducted along sectarian lines” in 
much the same way that residences 
had been segregated as “...many 
customers and shop owners in the 
capital say they will not return to 
their old mixed neighborhoods, 
fearing a revival of the bloodshed” 
(Hadid, 2007). The eff ects are 
clear in some of Baghdad’s most 
important economic centers: 
“lack of security, in addition to 
building the segregation walls, 
is causing the gradual decline of 
central wholesaler markets such 
as al-Rasheed market in Baghdad’s 
southern district of Doura and 
Shorja market in the heart of 
Baghdad.” Furthermore, violence 
has been highly unpredictable and 
can transform a neighborhood or 
market from one day to the next. 
Abdul-Ahad (2008) describes 
the chaotic scene following an 
explosion in a popular shopping 
neighborhood called Karrada:
[T]he traffi  c stopped, cars 
reversed and started driving 
on the wrong side of the 
road, bullets were fi red and 
ambulance cars raced in 
and out of the area. Smoke 
began to rise from two 
explosions that had killed 
68 people and injured 120. 
Karrada’s tranquility had 
been shattered. The next 
day the stores were empty 
and there were no shoppers 
on the street.
In order to cope and sustain 
livelihoods, many Baghdadis work 
within the informal economy. Iraq’s 
informal economy was already well 
established during the period of 
sanctions in the 1990s. However, 
instability and corruption have 
contributed to the growth of the 
informal economy since then. “The 
only part of the economy to have 
survived both Saddam Hussein and 
the post-2003 period of instability 
and insurgency is the country’s 
informal economy” (Looney, 2006, 
p. 991). GDP took a hit, shrinking by 
about 35 percent at the time of the 
American invasion and it has not 
rebounded (Looney, 2006, p. 991). 
When shop-owners, for example, 
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have found it diffi  cult to reach the 
neighborhoods their shops were 
formerly located in or have found 
themselves trapped living within 
a walled neighborhood which is 
costly to travel in and out of, they 
have often resorted to hastily 
setting up shop instead on their 
front lawns or wherever they could 
aff ord a space nearby. It is now 
conservatively estimated that the 
informal economy makes up about 
65 percent of GDP (Looney, 2006, p. 
1006).
Impact on Women
 The restrictions implemented 
throughout the city have also had a 
disproportionate eff ect on women’s 
lives in Baghdad. Women have 
been susceptible to gender-based 
violence and are thus even more 
isolated as a result of divisions. 
A professor at the University of 
Baghdad was interviewed about 
the ways that security is aff ecting 
mobility and he specifi cally pointed 
to widespread concern for the well-
being of women in this situation:
It took me three hours to 
reach home compared to 
the 15 minutes before 
2003...We no longer ask 
a taxi driver to take us to 
so and so place but to the 
next Izdiham (traffi  c jam). 
Women staff  members 
suff er the greatest. You see 
them waiting for taxis at 
5:30 or 6 am, to reach work 
at 8.30 or 9 and you wonder 
who is looking after their 
children or taking them to 
school. Women report wide 
scale sexual harassment 
from taxi drivers or 
youngsters at checkpoints...
At university we now let 
women leave at noon so as 
to reach home before dark. 
(Zangana, 2010, p. 52)
Furthermore, women’s roles have 
had to change as confl ict has taken 
its toll. As described above, when 
women are especially vulnerable to 
violence, they are further isolated 
for protection. However, as men 
became more vulnerable as targets 
of kidnapping and violence during 
civil war, women increasingly had to 
take on new roles within the context 
of confl ict. They were the ones who 
could more safely (albeit still in 
considerable danger) run errands 
and access the city and the eff ect 
of their mobility was the renewal 
of “initiatives and resilient part[s] 
of the social and service network 
of the people who remained in 
the city” (Zangana, 2010, p. 50). 
Women were essentially forced to 
take on this role in order to make up 
for the sudden changing dynamic 
where men were either targeted 
or had already been kidnapped or 
killed. They therefore organized 
within small communities so that 
they could protect and support 
each other and their children, 
took on employment more often, 
and became responsible for tasks 
formerly in the male domain, such 
as waiting in line for gasoline and 
burying the dead. (Zangana, 2010, 
p. 50-51)
Baghdadis protesting the segregation walls.
Image source: Sinan Salaheddin, Associated Press
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Exploring the eff ects of confl ict 
on the city of Baghdad leads, of 
course, to questions of whether 
and how urban challenges can be 
remedied. Violence levels are on the 
rise again and every month seems to 
bring record high casualties which 
have not been seen since at least 
2008. Al Jazeera English dubbed 
the summer of 2013 a “season of 
terror” (Arraf, 2013). When the U.S. 
withdrew its troops, many were 
worried that Iraq’s government and 
institutions were not developed 
enough to operate on their own. 
Parliamentary elections were 
recently held and are on track to 
continue the sectarian trajectory 
and re-elect Prime Minister Maliki. 
These elections were surrounded 
by increasing violence, protests met 
with crackdowns, and continued 
diffi  culties in development 
(Hendawi, 2014).
Martin Chulov (2012) critically 
analyzes Baghdad’s limited options 
RESEARCH QUESTION
Murals on Baghdad’s blast walls.
Image source: The Pickett Lens blog
going forward: partition, federalism, 
or do-nothing. Partition would 
create new nation-states - one for 
Shia, one for Sunnis, and one for 
Kurds - and break up Iraq as we 
know it. Federalism would follow 
Kurdistan’s lead and allow regions 
to claim a certain level of autonomy 
from the central government based 
in Baghdad. “The Sunni provinces of 
Anbar and Diyyala have made steps 
in this direction, but Maliki has 
vowed to prevent any such move 
taking hold” (Chulov, 2012). Finally, 
“do-nothing” would entail just that, 
allowing Baghdad to continue in a 
segregated, volatile state (Chulov, 
2012). However, do-nothing on the 
ground would defi nitely not look 
like inactivity. There are always 
stakeholders who are trying to 
maintain the status quo or to alter 
Baghdad in any number of ways, so 
there should inevitably be positive 
action fi ghting the eff ects of confl ict 
within that mix.
There are two main perspectives 
which are central in considering the 
urban condition - those of policy 
makers and of Baghdad’s residents. 
Furthermore, since confl ict has 
caused the city to regress in terms 
of its infrastructure and economy, 
the process of remedying the urban 
challenges created by confl ict is 
directly related to the process of 
reconstructing and redeveloping 
the city. Therefore, the goal of 
this thesis is to search for what is 
successful and/or has potential to 
positively aff ect Baghdad at the 
intersection of mitigating current 
urban challenges and redeveloping 
the city in the long-term. The 
question being posed is: what can 
be done to mitigate the impacts 
of these changes on the daily lives 
of Baghdadis and how can that 
mitigation in turn contribute to the 
redevelopment of Baghdad?
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cities there is a belief [that] 
governance is properly confi gured 
and capable of producing fair 
outcomes...governance amidst 
severe and unresolved multicultural 
diff erences can be viewed by at 
least one identifi able group in 
the city as artifi cial, imposed or 
illegitimate” (Bollens, 2008, p. 
1260). The sense of imposition 
or illegitimacy compounds the 
diffi  culties for government in 
implementing plans as it widens the 
gap between administration and 
citizen. It was military and political 
strategy which implemented 
control and security measures 
in the fi rst place and the current 
government continues to prioritize 
control for the sake of security. 
The municipality also seems to be 
supporting multi-million dollar 
developments such as Mansour 
Mall (Iraq’s Dinar, 2013), which help 
create an image of beautifi cation 
and development, but do not really 
address the structural problems on 
the ground which aff ect Baghdadi 
residents daily.
An Alternative for Redevelopment
An alternative is needed 
because government-led plans do 
not include the participation of the 
public, have diff erent priorities than 
residents have, and are diffi  cult to 
implement because of the layers 
of corruption and bureaucracy at 
the government level. Considering 
Zangana’s (2010, p. 50) example of 
women taking on new roles and thus 
creating resiliency for community 
initiatives and networks, there is 
great potential for such networks 
to impact the city if they can be 
identifi ed and supported. The best 
answer in Baghdad, therefore, 
are active community-based 
initiatives. This answer was arrived 
at based on three fi ndings. First, 
the inadequacies of municipality 
plans all derive from their lack of 
public voice. Second, based on 
those inadequacies, the alternative 
should be based on public voice 
and derive from the perspective 
of Baghdadi residents. Third, news 
and social media have pointed to 
the prevalence and success of this 
alternative.
The community-based initiative 
is a network of members, whether 
online or in physical space, who 
contribute to the creation of and 
Inadequacy of the City of 
Baghdad’s Plans
The Mayoralty of Baghdad 
does consult with architects and 
planners to create plans for city 
redevelopment. However, many of 
these plans have stalled because of 
low quality implementation, lack of 
funding, or changes in contractors 
and planning (G. Al Slik, personal 
communication, February 4, 2014). 
The deteriorating economy has 
a direct impact on the projects 
as well, as fl uctuations in costs 
of building materials and other 
resources are volatile. “Salam 
Ibrahim Kuba, an Iraqi consulting 
engineer, explains that ‘the 
widespread use of concrete blocks 
led to an astronomical increase in 
cement prices. It rose from 50,000 
Dinars per ton to 240,000 Dinars 
per ton in the last fi ve years’” 
(Zangana, 2010, p. 47-48). The 
implementation of the projects is 
also subject to corruption, which 
“is never far out of sight” (Erickson, 
2013). Peter Beaumont uses 
the “state of the pavements” of 
Baghdad, which are often dug up 
and abandoned by contractors who 
have bribed politicians for street 
renewal contracts, to illustrate the 
visibility of corruption and its eff ect 
on Baghdad’s infrastructure (as 
cited in Erickson, 2013).
Furthermore, the City’s plans 
do not generally include the 
participation of the public and 
are therefore based on diff erent 
priorities than what residents 
of Baghdad need. This seems to 
be simultaneously a cause and 
symptom of the perspective held 
by many of the government’s 
illegitimacy. “Whereas in most 
FINDINGS
The $35 million Mansour Mall.
Image source: Omer Laith, skyscrapercity
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which their networks are created 
as well as the relationships 
between the members of their 
networks. The communal type is 
a network of peers from within 
Baghdad which is more managed 
than led by some of its members; 
it also has occasional mentors 
entering the network, as much of 
the knowledge is self-taught, and 
occasional funding, as much of its 
operations are self-funded. The 
curated type is a network of peers 
connected to a network of mentors 
and funders through a central 
leader who curates educational 
programming and is the source of 
connection between members. This 
model operates internationally and 
depends on more diff erentiated 
roles within the community. The 
entrepreneurial type is initiated 
and led by an entrepreneur, but is 
crowd-sourced and thus connects 
peers indirectly through an online 
platform. 
All three types in these cases 
target similar populations - young 
adult, college educated residents 
of Baghdad. This is important and 
strategic; young Baghdadis have 
also been disproportionately 
impacted by the eff ects of confl ict 
similarly to women because 
they were educated within a 
deteriorating system and now face 
low job prospects as newcomers 
to the labor market. There are 
likely to be parallels between the 
initiatives and resiliency created by 
women’s activities during confl ict 
and those that can potentially be 
created by youth. Furthermore, 
these Baghdadis are necessary 
and desirable in Baghdad because 
they are the ones who will be 
sustain the mission of the group. 
In the context of Baghdad, they 
are venues for people to organize 
without regard to identity and often 
in the face of the divisive eff ects of 
confl ict on the city implemented by 
strategies for control and security. 
The identifi cation of community-
based initiatives as an alternative 
posits that the group can achieve 
more than the individual in terms 
of mitigating urban challenges. 
It also connects their activities 
to the legacy of the pre-confl ict 
socio-economic dynamics integral 
to Baghdad. Considering the 
lack of mobility, lack of agency, 
and isolation that Baghdadis 
experience, what is possible or 
what can be done better as a group 
that is diffi  cult or less benefi cial to 
do as an individual?
The case studies described 
below reveal that community-based 
initiatives are able to transcend 
the urban divisions and isolation 
created by confl ict and benefi t from 
shared resources contributed by 
various members of the networks. 
Specifi cally, in terms of the urban 
eff ects of confl ict, community-
based initiatives are able to provide 
inclusion and set up unrestricted 
fl ows. The initiatives also address 
economic impacts by fi lling gaps in 
education and increasing potential 
for successful employment and/
or self-employment. As Fig. 3 
shows, three case studies have 
been chosen to illustrate the role 
of community-based initiatives. 
Each of these represents a type 
within the universe of similar 
groups: communal, curated, and 
entrepreneurial. The three types 
are diff erentiated by the way in 
able to contribute to the city’s 
redevelopment, but they are also 
the ones with the most incentive 
to leave because Baghdad’s 
infrastructure cannot provide for 
their educational and employment 
needs. Youth unemployment in 
Iraq as of 2011 was at an average 
of twenty percent and this is 
a major incentive for young, 
educated Iraqis to emigrate (IRIN, 
2011). For example, “Baghdad taxi 
driver Ahmed Hassan qualifi ed as 
a mechanical engineer in 2001, 
but has since struggled to fi nd a 
job commensurate with his skills, 
despite sending off  numerous 
applications” (IRIN, 2011). As 
explained earlier, the Municipality’s 
priorities do not align with the 
needs of this important group. 
Despite studies which show the 
need to plan for youth, “[p]olitical 
wrangling and security challenges 
[have] diverted the government 
from focusing on youth” (IRIN, 
2011). At the same time, Iraq’s 
National Youth Survey shows that 
young Iraqis do not want to abandon 
their country and hope that 
development will allow them to fi nd 
stable employment (IRIN, 2011). 
There is a major gap, of course, 
between the optimistic youth’s 
hopes to be successful in Baghdad 
and the reality that the economy is 
not ready to support them. This is 
where community-based initiatives 
can build that missing support by 
sharing resources, attracting funds 
for educational activities and 
startup capital and allowing the 
youth to develop themselves and 
be successful in Baghdad despite 
the city’s broken infrastructure.
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independent arts workspace, 
summer arts intensive
live mapping by app users of street 
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increased access where bandwidth 
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mentors / by credentials
mobile data/internet access
scale & reach
up to 30 participants per week about 15-20 participants per 
program
up to 5,000 app visits per day
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Fikra Space is Baghdad’s fi rst 
hackerspace, which is a “community-
operated physical [place], where 
people can meet and work on their 
projects” (Hackerspaces, 2014). This 
initiative represents the communal 
type because it is operates through 
a network of peers. Fikra Space is 
made up of and run by Baghdadis 
who are interested in collaborating 
with other people, sharing resources 
and knowledge, and developing 
projects and ideas in a horizontal 
(non-hierarchical), inclusive way.
It was initiated by the Global 
Entrepreneurship and Maker Space 
Initiative (GEMSI), an organization 
which seeks to spread the 
hackerspace movement throughout 
the Middle East (GEMSI, 2013) and 
was founded by Bilal Ghalib, an 
Iraqi-American computer scientist 
and entrepreneur. He was inspired 
by a trip to Baghdad to provide a 
space for smart, creative, optimistic 
people to collaborate. GEMSI’s goal 
has been to identify leaders with 
interesting projects or ideas in the 
communities in which Gemsi works, 
rather than to run the hackerspaces 
themselves (B. Ghalib, personal 
communication, February 17, 
2014). GEMSI is thus no longer 
directly involved with Fikra Space 
- and it was intended that way. 
Instead, it is led and managed 
independently and from within by 
some of its community members. 
The leaders’ goal is not to program 
the space, but to channel the fl ow of 
ideas and creativity in a productive 
direction while providing the tools 
and space for people to work freely 
on any project (Fikra Space leaders, 
personal communication, March 27, 
2014).
Participation & Membership
Ghalib described the 
participants as “...people who were 
optimistic change-makers, people 
that wanted to be a part of Iraq’s 
future” (Fikra Space, 2013). Their 
membership is not exclusive or 
restricted in any way - according to 
their Facebook marketing, anyone 
who is interested is free to attend 
any of their events. However, there 
does seem to be a demographic 
which is especially interested in and 
attracted to participating in Fikra 
Space. The core group is made up 
of 14-30 year olds who are mostly 
male and educated (Fikra Space 
leaders, personal communication, 
March 27, 2014). Most of their 
events attract anywhere between 
15-50 participants.
Programming
While most hackerspaces are 
identifi ed as tech-centric, Fikra 
Space has spawned projects and 
classes based on tech, social media, 
music, and literature. For example, 
through Project Read More, 
participants nominate and vote 
on ten books per year to read and 
discuss regularly as a group. Some 
members have produced a podcast 
intended to entertain Baghdadis 
stuck in the city’s inevitable traffi  c 
(Hume, 2013). Fikra Space Media 
Entertainment is a new Youtube 
channel created by members of 
the hackerspace who are interested 
in sharing a platform on which to 
create their own shows. The usual 
process of project development 
has participants meet, defi ne what 
A 3D printing workshop with GEMSI’s Bilal Ghalib.
Image source: Fikra Space Facebook page
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they want to learn, look for others 
who can teach them, create an 
agenda and post it online. In most 
cases, the participants are teaching 
each other, although professionals 
do get involved in some projects. 
(Fikra Space leaders, personal 
communication, March 27, 2014)
Geographic Scale
Fikra Space’s programming 
is highly bounded by Baghdad in 
terms of its production. Its major 
relationship outside of Baghdad is 
with GEMSI and, specifi cally, with 
Bilal Ghalib. The Space is therefore 
indirectly connected with other 
hackerspaces in the MIddle East 
which are associated with Gemsi 
and those connections are evident 
in some of their social media 
network. Furthermore, several of 
FIkra Space’s participants are Iraqi 
expats who live in Canada and the 
US, but visit Baghdad every so often 
to work on projects in or bring some 
outside resources and knowledge to 
the Space. Social media, especially 
Facebook, reveals that the most 
visible participants, including those 
expats, are generally active in 
community-based and educational 
initiatives and workshops 
throughout Iraq. For example, there 
is a signifi cant overlap between 
members of Fikra Space and of a 
social media education group called 
Iraqi Network for Social Media.
Internet & Social Media Presence
Fikra Space exists both 
physically and online. However, its 
main and strongest network is its 
physical network between regular 
members who physically participate 
in project development and attend 
events at the headquarters. This 
is the central network that allows 
participants to take full advantage 
of the supportive and sharing 
system created by the Space.
The space does take advantage 
of social media both to promote 
the space itself and to develop 
projects such as Fikra Space Media 
Entertainment. Its primary presence 
online is on the Facebook page, 
which members use to network, 
schedule and advertise events, and 
post photos of their activities. This 
type of online presence clearly 
allows the Space to expand its 
network and reach collaborators 
and supporters from outside 
Baghdad. At the same time, it is 
conceivable, considering that most 
of its projects are developed locally 
and its members are all local, for 
Fikra Space to exist without social 
media, albeit in a much more 
limited capacity.
Funding
In order to do this, they depend 
on their members to share resources 
and knowledge. They also use 
donated resources. For example, 
they use member donations to 
some extent, but they also accept 
assistance from professionals in 
limited ways. Most recently, they 
were able to establish headquarters 
in the Karrada neighborhood when 
a professional organization donated 
some of their offi  ce space that was 
not being used. Based on this system 
of sharing resources, they are able 
to remain largely independent and 
self-funded. (Fikra Space leaders, 
personal communication, March 27, 
2014)
Government & Politics
Fikra Space does not have 
any stated relationship with 
the government or with any 
international political bodies. 
Although the current leaders 
of Fikra did not take a stance 
regarding the government, Ghalib 
emphasized the importance of 
maintaining independence from 
the government for the success 
of the Space (B. Ghalib, personal 
communication, February 17, 
2014). Fikra therefore also does not 
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A music workshop at Fikra Space.
Image source: Fikra Space Facebook page
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take a political stance or take on 
political roles in Baghdad.
Future & Growth
The hope for the future is 
to create an environment in 
which participants can develop 
themselves through their projects 
and shared education and that this 
will in turn allow them to contribute 
back to the city. Leaders of the 
Space are considering scaling the 
hackerspace by maintaining and 
growing their central location while 
starting satellite hackerspaces 
around Baghdad and throughout 
Iraq (Fikra Space leaders, personal 
communication, March 27, 2014). 
Ghalib’s vision for growth is to 
scale up with independence in 
mind; therefore, he hopes that Fikra 
Space will focus on multiplying the 
space and growing horizontally 
in order to remain sustainable 
without depending on too much 
outside funding (B. Ghalib, personal 
communication, February 17, 
2014).
Contribution to Baghdad
The major accomplishment of 
Fikra Space within the context of 
Baghdad’s confl ict and division is 
its inclusivity. They transcend the 
destructive trend in Baghdad of 
segregation by consistently defi ning 
and advertising events as open to 
all, avoiding political association, 
maintaining independence, 
and structuring their network 
as benefi cial between peers. 
Furthermore, the Space is a venue 
for interaction between people 
of diff erent ethnic and sectarian 
identifi cation. The products of the 
Space have great potential in terms 
of what they might contribute to 
the redevelopment of the city. Fikra 
Space’s participants are creating 
a network of human capital for 
Baghdad; together, they are able 
to access technology, resources, 
and knowledge which they would 
likely otherwise be isolated from 
individually.
Fikra Space’s one year anniversary event at Beit Babel art gallery.
Image source: Fikra Space Facebook page
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Sada, Iraq is a non-profi t, 
primarily educational initiative to 
strengthen Iraqi artists and arts 
practices. Sada represents the 
curated type because it is based on 
guided programming provided by 
scholars and mentors. Furthermore, 
its programming is structured and 
bounded by its focus on the arts 
and its dependence on funding 
from and partnerships with other 
artists and non-profi t organizations.
It was founded by and continues 
to be led by Iraq-American artist 
and scholar Rijin Sahakian. 
Sahakian poses the question, “what 
does it mean that there’s not a lot 
of information coming out of a 
radically changed place” (Sahakian, 
2013, April 5)? The answer she 
found and the impetus for the 
founding of Sada is that a gap in 
arts education and insecurity for 
artists are preventing them from 
putting out new work. The goal 
of the organization is to provide 
participants with education and 
resources they need to create and 
sustain their own arts practices and 
spaces (Sada, 2013).
Participation & Membership
The initiative works with fi ne 
arts students who are usually about 
19-35 years old and are looking to 
practice and teach art in Baghdad 
(Sahakian, 2013, April 5). Sada 
is exclusive in the sense that it 
targets artists and often has limited 
capacity for its programs, especially 
when travel is involved and visas 
are required. However, it has a far 
reach within the international arts 
community, from which it receives 
funding as well as participation by 
various artists who volunteer as 
mentors and educators. Thus, Sada’s 
membership is made up of both 
students and practicing artists who 
constitute a larger, global network 
made up of the local network of 
Baghdadi artists and the network 
of mentors outside of the city. 
Sahakian is the central connector 
between networks.
Programming
Sada’s work is done through 
several programs, including seed 
production and residency grants, 
online workshops for emerging 
artists to learn from experienced 
artists around the world, 
independent arts workspace to 
give artists a physical center, and 
a summer arts intensive through 
which young artists have the chance 
to travel and learn (Sada, 2013). 
Specifi cally, the independent arts 
workspace is described by the 
organization as key to helping local 
artists get around the problems and 
barriers they face. For example, the 
presence of this community space 
is intended to remedy “disruptive 
interference by government and 
university administrators into the 
work of artists...intimidation and 
threat...lack of a substantial arts 
library...and no independent spaces 
to serve as art-making studios or 
exhibition centers” (Sada, 2013). 
Sada supported the creation and 
installation of a large artwork 
depicting an eye and the words “I 
can see you” in Arabic (Sahakian, 
2013, June 8). The eye was displayed 
in Baghdad on top of a tall building 
which faced both Tahrir Square and 
the Green Zone as a very public 
commentary on residents’ limited 
mobility and restricted freedom 
to organize in public spaces while 
living under strong security and 
surveillance measures.
Geographic Scale
In order to fully expose 
students to the arts and to reach 
both mentors and funders, Sada 
really takes advantage of an 
international arts network. Sada 
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requires international relationships 
in order to address Sahakian’s 
primary concern about the isolation 
of Iraqi artists. For example, in 
October 2013, the initiative set up 
an online exchange with artists in 
El Paso, Texas, creating connections 
between two “urban deserts” and a 
dialogue between artists living on 
either side of the Iraq War (Sada, 
2013). In this way, Sada allows for 
artistic knowledge and expression 
to fl ow two ways - both into and out 
of Baghdad.
Internet & Social Media Presence
Although Sada’s artists do 
travel for some of its programs, 
the initiative’s networks depend 
on the internet to exist because 
they are international and because 
Baghdad’s insecurity usually 
prevents mentors from coming in 
to the city to interact with students 
physically. Sada also maintains a 
presence on social media, especially 
Facebook, to update on its activities, 
publicize member artists’ work, and 
connect with the international arts 
community as well as with those 
who are interested in and write 
about or otherwise feature Sada in 
their own work.
Funding
Sada is “fi scally sponsored” by 
a nonprofi t called ArteEast based 
in New York City. It is also funded 
through individual donations as 
well as grants from other nonprofi ts 
and arts foundations including the 
Hivos Foundation and the Prince 
Claus Fund, both of which are based 
in The Netherlands and co-fund 
arts and culture with the Dutch 
Ministry of Foreign Aff airs. (Sada, 
2013) Although these foundations 
seem to be quite transparent and 
Sada clearly does not restrict 
its programming or its artists 
politically, it should be noted that 
Royal-Dutch Shell, a British/Dutch 
oil company, does have signifi cant 
contracts and, thus, corporate 
interests in Iraq (UPI, 2013).
Government & Politics
Sada is not registered with the 
Iraqi government (Sahakian, 2013, 
April 5) as of yet and does not 
seem to need to be. Although there 
is much to say about the state of 
Baghdad, the politics surrounding 
the city, and the eff ects of confl ict on 
the urban environment, it remains 
diffi  cult and dangerous for artists to 
express themselves. One of Sada’s 
students, a photographer, describes 
the way that he photographs the 
city “stealthily. I snap the picture 
and I run without anyone seeing 
me” (Bilal, 2012). As Sahakian’s 
questions about the lack of 
expression coming out of Baghdad 
indicate, Sada does not restrain its 
support based on politics. The “I 
can see you” installation is a prime 
example of Sada’s encouragement 
for artistic expression regarding 
Baghdad’s political issues.
Future & Growth
Sahakian has specifi cally stated 
that Sada’s vision is not to start 
an art scene in Baghdad, because 
one already exists (Sahakian, 
2013, April 5). Rather, Sada is 
looking to develop and sustain arts 
practices by providing a stronger 
infrastructure. Therefore, it seems 
that Sada’s vision actively avoids 
the commercialization of Iraqi 
The ‘I Can See You’ installation supported by Sada.
Image source: Sada Facebook page
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art. Its strategy for the future is 
to enable a sustainable model 
through which artists are more 
involved in programming and thus 
teach and support each other. There 
is no stated intention specifi cally 
to grow or replicate; Sada’s focus is 
instead on sustainability.
Contribution to Baghdad
Sada primarily fi lls the gap in 
arts education found in Iraq today. 
Sahakian refl ects often on the 
isolation which Iraqi artists suff ered 
as a result of brain drain and lack 
of access to educational resources, 
especially in the past decade since 
the Iraq War. She was shocked to 
fi nd that their knowledge of art 
history ended in the 1960s with the 
work of Jackson Pollock (Sahakian, 
2013, April 5). Baghdad’s own 
Academy of Fine Arts, once a center 
for art and culture and the home 
to a large library, was victim to the 
city-wide looting which took place 
immediately after the invasion. 
Today, the school is surrounded by 
blast walls and checkpoints, but 
it uses an outdated arts education 
system anyway. Furthermore, there 
are few museums and galleries left 
open in Baghdad. (Bilal, 2012)
A group of Sada participants with Rijin Sahakian (seated, second from right).
Image source: Sada Facebook page
An online workshop with Professor Sinan Antoon.
Image source: Sada Facebook page
URBAN CONFLICT & COMMUNITY INITIATIVES  /  BAGHDAD 22
CASE STUDIES  /  GOPHAST
GoPhast is an innovative 
mobile application which relies on 
crowd-sourced information to feed 
users live, mapped information 
on blocked or closed streets and 
traffi  c jams. It is an entrepreneurial 
initiative whose community is the 
online crowd-source.
It is developed by Sadeq 
Shnaishel, a computer scientist who 
was discussing ways to deal with 
Baghdad’s traffi  c problems with his 
friends when they came up with 
this solution. GoPhast’s mission 
is to address issues of mobility in 
Baghdad by helping people get 
around deteriorating infrastructure 
and the urban control measures 
which have been implemented 
throughout the city. (S. Shnaishel, 
personal communication, March 28, 
2014)
Participation & Membership
The app is accessible to 
anyone who has mobile internet 
capability. It currently has up to 
5,000 visitors per day and the app’s 
Facebook page claims 177,000 
“likes.” Shanishel remains the 
primary developer of the app, but 
has limited assistance from other 
computer scientists. (S. Shnaishel, 
personal communication, March 28, 
2014)
Programming
GoPhast works by providing 
an online platform featuring a map 
and options for labeling streets as 
closed, accessible, blocked, fl ooded, 
etc. Points are geolocated using 
GPS. Users can open the app as they 
are travelling through Baghdad, 
label streets they encounter by 
dropping a point on the map, and 
pan through the map to plan easier 
travel routes based on other users’ 
labels. Furthermore, the street 
labels are color coded and time 
stamped.
Geographic Scale
GoPhast is highly local. The 
app is completely operated by 
Shnaishel, used within Baghdad, 
and almost totally self-funded.
Internet & Social Media Presence
Although GoPhast is not 
considered a social media platform, 
it currently depends completely 
on mobile internet access. The 
initiative is supplemented by a 
social media presence used to 
advertise new features, solicit 
contributions, and further the 
collaborative mapping process 
through the sharing of photos of 
Baghdad’s traffi  c conditions.
Funding
One of Shnaishel’s main 
concerns and challenges is funding. 
He currently develops and funds the 
app himself as a side project with 
occasional help from collaborators, 
but would like to turn the initiative 
into his full time job. He is also 
strategizing to fi nd ways that the 
app could bring in revenue to 
fund itself. (S. Shnaishel, personal 
communication, March 28, 2014)
Government & Politics
GoPhast does not take any 
offi  cial political stance. It operates 
on the ground to address mobility 
issues without reference to or 
attempt to directly infl uence the 
government’s role in providing 
transportation and creating road 
barriers.
Founder, Sadeq Shnaishel.
Image source: StartUp Weekend Baghdad
The GoPhast mobile app interface.
Image source: Mobile app screenshot
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Shnaishel is currently working 
to add new features and expand 
the app, but he does face some 
challenges which are, of course, 
specifi c to Baghdad. For example, 
the city has poor GPS location 
services, slow internet provision, 
and low subscription to data plans 
on mobile phones. He hopes to 
fi nd ways to circumvent these 
challenges by altering the app so 
that it uses less bandwidth or is 
even available offl  ine. Furthermore, 
he is looking to expand GoPhast 
through complementary services 
such as PhastTaxi, which would 
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Baghdad’s standstill traffi  c.
Image source: GoPhast Facebook page
allow users to request taxis 
and further ease mobility for 
Baghdadis. (S. Shnaishel, personal 
communication, March 28, 2014)
Contribution to Baghdad
Of the three cases studied, 
GoPhast most directly addresses 
the urban environment and the 
challenges within it that have 
resulted from confl ict. Its strategy is 
also the most short-term, as it seeks 
to provide immediate relief to 
Baghdad’s residents from the city’s 
troubled streets. However, GoPhast 
does have long term eff ects. First, it 
has successfully created a network 
through which people indirectly 
communicate, help each other, 
and benefi t from other people’s 
contributions regardless of ethno-
sectarian identity; this sort of 
structure supports attitudes of 
sharing and connection in the 
face of the universal challenge of 
mobility. Second, it raises awareness 
about Baghdad’s troubled traffi  c 
conditions and will inevitably point 
to the most aff ected streets and 
intersections over time, thereby 
creating a valuable record of the 
city’s infrastructural defi ciencies.
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All three of the initiatives 
studied successfully bring 
people together and engage 
them around common goals and 
interests. Together, they represent 
a strong support system for their 
demographic which transcends 
urban and social division and 
also fi lls gaps in education and 
infrastructure. They all also fi ll needs 
for Baghdadis. The initiatives each 
act as a venue for young Baghdadis 
to participate meaningfully on a 
shared platform despite the barriers 
in governance which prevent them 
from directly participating in offi  cial 
redevelopment policies. They also 
all contribute more or less directly 
to their city’s urban environment. 
Fikra Space and Sada particularly fi ll 
gaps in education and aspire to also 
create better and more successful 
employment for their members. 
Furthermore, by creating physical 
communities, they are providing 
the “social and spatial inclusion” as 
well as “unrestricted fl ows”(Davis, 
2011, p. 231), specifi cally of 
information and communication, 
that will help enable members to 
gain a sense of citizenship. GoPhast, 
on the other hand, is working to 
more directly address Baghdad’s 
urban environment. In doing so, the 
app is literally attempting to ease 
restricted traffi  c fl ows.
However, it is clear that these 
initiatives are really successful 
just for that young, educated 
demographic which has been 
identifi ed. They do not necessarily 
seek to address division along 
other lines besides ethno-sectarian 
confl ict. For example, Fikra Space 
is often dominated by young 
men and the group does not 
actively seek to bridge the gap in 
female interest or participation in 
hackerspace projects. Therefore, 
they address both the urban and 
economic impacts of confl ict, but 
not necessarily the signifi cant 
impacts on women despite the 
parallels between the initiatives 
created by women’s groups and 
those created for young Baghdadis. 
Furthermore, all three primarily 
depend on educated, middle to 
upper-middle class Baghdadis who 
have access to internet and social 
media. GoPhast especially excludes 
those without internet access or 
internet literacy simply by the 
nature of the platform. In GoPhast’s 
case, however, Shnaishel is actively 
trying to address this gap and make 
the app useful to those with limited 
internet access.
Stepping back to consider 
the community-based initiatives’ 
origins and missions in the context 
of confl ict raises an interesting 
similarity - they were attracted 
to Baghdad and created there 
because it is a city in confl ict. This 
poses questions in terms of their 
limitations as well. Since they 
began from and were intended for 
this context, can they and how will 
they continue if Baghdad becomes 
more stable? At what point, if at all, 
should they consider partnering 
with governmental planners and 
policy-makers? Although it is 
beyond the scope of this thesis, it 
is worth examining whether such 
intiatives could have existed under 
Saddam’s regime and, thus, how 
vulnerable they are to changes in 
both city and national level politics.




are models for what is needed in 
Baghdad for redevelopment. They 
share at least four characteristics 
which enable them to help 
Baghdad’s residents deal with 
urban challenges and contribute 
to the city: they depend on 
participants, encourage a high 
level of engagement, share 
resources and knowledge, and are 
driven by youth and optimism. 
Therefore, it is desirable to fi rst, 
strategize for their sustainability 
and second, to replicate and/or 
scale them up where possible. 
Strategies should also consider 
and plan for the increasingly 
volatile urban environment they 
exist within. Planning can take on 
those explorations and analysis 
which are beyond the scope and/
or capabilities of the community-
based initiatives, including 
planning for future volatility, 
understanding the universe of 
initiatives and stakeholders, and 
measuring benefi ts to participants. 
Such support by planners can help 
existing initiatives to grow through 
and new initiatives to embark 
upon better charted pathways 
for strength and sustainability of 
membership and networks.
Based on the case studies, the 
best strategy for a self-sustaining 
initiative is to create a culture of 
shared resources and knowledge. 
Sada’s example, while successful, 
shows the potential fragility of a 
network that depends on distant 
mentors, grant funding, and the 
central connection of the founder. 
The initiative is thus strategizing 
to ensure that the community of 
artists which has been created 
around Sada can continue the 
goal of education and support for 
emerging arts practices. Sahakian 
has identifi ed the enabling of 
student artists to contribute to 
and guide programming for the 
initiative as well as become mentors 
themselves as key to sustaining 
Sada. As a result of the nature 
of its structure, Fikra Space has 
achieved a very strong example of 
sustainability through sharing; the 
Space does not require funding to 
function. GoPhast cannot succeed 
without and is also driven by the 
contributions of the crowd, which 
gives it some strength in numbers.
For a communal type of 
community-based initiative like 
Fikra Space, both replication and 
scaling may be easy given the 
horizontality and city-wide reach of 
its network. The current leaders of 
the Space have expressed ambitions 
to both grow and establish the 
current headquarters as the 
central space within a network of 
spaces throughout Baghdad and 
Iraq (Fikra Space leaders, personal 
communication, March 27, 2014). 
Ghalib, on the other hand, has a 
slightly diff erent hope that Fikra 
Space will not grow centrally but 
rather replicate itself in order to 
maintain smaller budgets and, thus, 
independence from signifi cant 
funding needs (B. Ghalib, personal 
communication, February 17, 2014). 
However, the priority should be to 
always strengthen the network and 
connections between members 
to maintain the mission. It would 
seem that, while seriously keeping 
Ghalib’s concern for independence 
in mind, a center is necessary for 
the success of a Fikra Space network 
not only at each location but across 
all of the locations to maximize the 
benefi ts of participation.
In the case of the curated type 
of community-based initiative 
like Sada, the network structure 
is more vertical and is thus more 
diffi  cult to replicate. Its success 
depends on specifi c connections 
between mentors, the founder, 
and students as well as funding for 
specifi c programming. However, 
scalability is desirable and feasible 
to reach more artists throughout 
Iraq and to involve more artists 
from around the world. Achieving 
this depends on spreading word 
about the accomplishments and 
growth of current participants. A 
model can be developed based on 
their experiences and programming 
should be revised according to 
necessary improvements and new 
partnerships. Furthermore, as the 
fi rst student artist participants 
gain experience and their practices 
take hold, there is great potential 
for them to develop their own 
relationships within Baghdad as 
mentors to more emerging artists. 
In this way, the local network can 
become self-sustaining.
The entrepreneurial and crowd-
sourced model of community-
based initiative has signifi cant 
potential to both replicate and 
scale up. Replication will depend 
mostly on the provision of startup 
capital. Although Shnaishel was 
willing to take on GoPhast as a side 
project, putting in his own time and 
funds, the lack of capital is a barrier 
for most people. Scaling up will 
mean reaching more people who 
can contribute to the initiative in 
URBAN CONFLICT & COMMUNITY INITIATIVES  /  BAGHDAD 26
RECOMMENDATIONS
order to make it more informative 
and useful. A simple way to do so 
would be to invest more time and 
energy into advertising the tool, 
although Shnaishel seems to have 
done a very good job spreading 
the word through social media. It 
is more important, therefore, to 
consider the infrastructural barriers 
to growth, especially the reliability 
of internet and mobile data access. 
These barriers can only be overcome 
to a limited extent until they are 
addressed by policy makers and 
developers, which does not seem 
likely. Could crowdsourcing can be 
used to create an infrastructure by 
the people?
Initiative Leader/Founder
As someone who is the leader 
of or looking to start a community-
based initiative, the goal should be 
to focus on participant engagement 
by maintaining fl exibility and 
evolving according to participants’ 
needs. In order to prioritize 
participant engagement, funding 
sources and their related interests 
should be considered. Furthermore, 
scale and management of the 
initiative should be structured such 
that the network is or could be 
self-sustaining, especially where 
there are fragile connections such 
as those which exist only online 
or which depend on outside 
mentors or professionals. It 
will also be crucial for initiative 
leaders to develop more of a self-
consciousness, especially regarding 
the initiative’s relationship to other 
key players in Baghdad, including 
politicians, private fi rms, and other 
non-governmental organizations. 
This can be done both by taking a 
stance toward Baghdad and the 
social, political, and economic 
environments within which they 
exist, or even by establishing a 
non-stance, through the mission 
statement based on an evaluation 
of the initiative’s activities and 
trajectory thus far. If an explicit 
goal for social responsibility can 
be established, then it will be more 
likely to be realized and to have 
an impact on the redevelopment 
of Baghdad. Sada is a good 
example of such a self-conscious, 
socially responsible mandate with 
outcomes that fi ll those explicit 
goals.
Investor/Mentor
A potential investor or mentor 
should take on a role similar to that 
which GEMSI played in catalyzing 
the development of Fikra Space. 
The goal should be to identify and 
enable leaders and projects that 
already exist within the city or the 
target community. This is benefi cial 
for two reasons. First, it will allow 
for the fl exibility and prioritization 
of the community’s needs. Second, 
it will build off  of resources, 
knowledge, and even networks 
which have already begun to form, 
Baghdad’s famous Firdos Square.
Image source: Getty Images
thus strengthening the initiative. 
Furthermore, as is evident through 
GoPhast’s challenges in particular, 
the provision of or access to startup 
capital and other funding may be 
crucial to really get initiatives off  
the ground.
City Offi  cial/Consultant
The critical issue at the 
Municipality level is the lack of 
engagement with community-based 
initiatives or even with residents of 
Baghdad in general. The goals from 
the perspective of those within 
city government should therefore 
be to recognize the activities and 
importance of community-based 
initiatives and the legitimacy of 
their voices. Furthermore, the City 
has a unique ability to support the 
functions of these initiatives by 
strengthening the infrastructure 
that makes their work possible, 
including internet access and urban 
mobility. Finally, the organizational 
models of the cases studied show 
that independence is important 
to them; thus, the government 
would ideally recognize and 
support initiatives without exerting 
infl uence by maintaining political 
distance.
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As these initiatives are 
relatively new in Baghdad and 
their focus has been on building 
networks, many questions come 
up for a very uncertain future. The 
central issues to be explored is 
whether these initiatives have any 
measurable outcomes which benefi t 
their participants. The limitations 
to the research conducted to 
understand community-based 
initiatives in Baghdad are based 
on the researcher’s inability to 
visit Baghdad due to security 
concerns. As a result, research and 
interviews had to be conducted 
long-distance, primarily via email 
and/or communication through 
social media. 
However, there were 
considerations for a more robust 
methodology regarding this topic 
through the implementation of 
cognitive mapping. In a 2013 study 
in Jerusalem, mental mapping 
was used to analyze eighteen 
women’s perceptions of territory 
and security and, thus, to provide “a 
new methodological approach for 
investigating segregation in cities” 
(Raanan & Shoval, 2013, p. 28). The 
study found, within their sample, 
a strong relationship between 
perceived territorial boundaries 
and actual spatial activity (Raanan & 
Shoval, 2013, p. 38). Using the case 
study in Jerusalem as an example, 
it would greatly supplement this 
research to have participants 
of various community-based 
initiatives participate in a cognitive 
mapping study for Baghdad. The 
product could illuminate the 
perceptions that initiative members 
have of their city and whether their 
participation in those initiative 
networks has any impact on the 
way they perceive and/or interact 
with Baghdad.
Furthermore, it would be 
important to study the community-
based initiatives over time by 
tracking membership through 
surveys and the maintenance 
of comprehensive databases 
describing participants 
demographically as well as in 
terms of their social and economic 
well-being. For example, such 
tracking could answer questions 
including whether participants in 
an initiative like Fikra Space are 
more likely within their age group 
and socioeconomic status to have 
employment or to achieve higher 
education than their counterparts 
who are not members of comparable 
initiatives.
If such an impact can be 
established and the networks 
successfully grow over time, then 
it will become more important 
for these initiatives to establish 
themselves as signifi cant 
contributors to and voices in the 
city. Whether their mission is 
political or not, surely the political 
system will take notice of such 
groups and their networks. What is 
then to be the relationship between 
community-based initiatives and 
the political system they exist 
under?  Furthermore, as recent 
events have shown an increase 
in violence in Baghdad and the 
potential for a renewed civil war, 
will the initiatives be able to 
continue to operate? An analysis of 
the political structures and levels of 
infl uence in Baghdad is required in 
order to fi nd the space within which 
community-based initiatives can 
operate, whether that can continue 
to be in a capacity completely 
separated from the municipality or 
that it must be through some sort of 
relationship with the government.
The initiatives’ limitations 
should also be further understood 
and contextualized within the wider 
universe of non-governmental 
groups and services which 
Baghdadis have access to. The 
most important question to answer 
here is whether it is desirable for 
community-based initiatives which 
target young educated adults to 
try to remedy their shortcomings. 
What is their role in those terms? 
Are there others who fi ll the gap by 
targeting populations of diff erent 
age groups or economic class, for 
example, and what does or should 
the network look like between 
diff erent initiatives?
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Planning is crucial in tackling 
further research in order to identify, 
better understand, and support 
community-based initiatives by 
giving them the tools to know 
their needs for development, 
growth, and further impact on 
Baghdad. Planning’s role is thus to 
illuminate the keys to the success, 
strength, and sustainability of 
community-based initiatives 
and their networks. In the next 
step, planning’s role is to enable 
initiatives to use the benefi ts they 
produce to then contribute back 
to the development of Baghdad. 
The diversity of the initiatives’ 
programming can translate to 
economic diversifi cation, which 
may lead to a stronger economy 
as well as more and better 
employment opportunities for 
youth. The initiative networks are 
also instrumental in increasing 
members’ sense of sovereignty 
and citizenship in their city, thus 
establishing positive identities 
and attitudes toward Baghdad and 
its challenges. Community-based 
initiatives represent optimism 
amongst Baghdadis for a deeper, 
more sustainable security built 
from within their own communities; 
if such groups can be active and 
collaborative in Baghdad, then 
there is hope for the city.
Baghdad’s beloved Freedom Monument, designed by artist Iraqi Jawad Saleem.
Image source: aliraqi.org
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